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Since the United States Supreme Court changed the face of federal
sentencing with Apprendi v. New Jersey,' it has engaged in substantial
mid-course corrections in Blakely v. Washington2 and United States v.
Booker,3 and, to a limited degree, in Rita v. United States.4 The pattern
of litigation is interesting in and of itself and may bear on the durability
of these changes. These were sentencing reforms-a revolution to
some-masterminded and led by the highest court in the land, dragging
the somewhat reluctant appellate courts with them.
The changes could not have come too soon. To a district court
judge who has chafed under the mandatory United States Sentencing
Guidelines regime, widely regarded as a failure in many respects,5 it has
been a welcome change. Nor am I alone. District court judges across the
country have had the same experience, especially in federal drug cases.
You apply the Sentencing Guidelines, as you have been told you must,
and you tally up the numbers and determine where the defendant is on
the grid, and ultimately come up with a result that makes no sense by any
measure. It is inconsistent with the purposes of sentencing in the Sen-
tencing Reform Act (SRA); 6 it is out of proportion to the defendant's
culpability and to sentences that have been meted out for far worse, even
violent offenses; it is not at all what the public-if they knew all the
facts-would demand.7
Whatever the ultimate result of the Booker changes, one thing is
clear: The Supreme Court has unleashed a new sentencing debate, far
beyond the tired themes of the past twenty years of guideline reform.
t District Judge, United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts; Visiting
Lecturer, Yale Law School; B.A., Barnard College, 1967; M.A., Yale University, 1970; J.D., Yale
Law School, 1971.
1. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
2. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
3. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
4. 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
5. See, e.g., Anthony N. Doob, The United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines: If
You Don't Know Where You Are Going, You Might Not Get There, in THE POLITICS OF SENTENCING
REFORM 199, 199-201 (Chris Clarkson & Rod Morgan eds., 1995); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 115 (2003); see also Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of
Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 2 (2006) ("[According to the Guidelines] [s]entencing disparities
generally and racial disparities in particular worsened, and proportionality links between the serious-
ness of crimes and the severity of punishment were broken.").
6. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (2007).
7. See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715,750-51 (2005).
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For most of the past two decades judges have asked only, "Am I doing
the same thing as the judge in the next courtroom is doing?"--even if
neither judge is ordering sentences that make any sense. Now we are
starting to look again at what works, what sentences may make a differ-
ence to the offender and to society, and what a just sentencing regime
really requires. 8 To be sure, the answers are not clear, but at the very
least the issues are being raised.
My hope in this short essay is to go beyond describing the implica-
tions of Rita, the Supreme Court's latest decision. I attempt to predict
how Rita is likely to be applied, and argue that an additional course cor-
rection by the Supreme Court is needed to make sentencing fully consis-
tent with Booker, perhaps one which is already teed up on the Court's
docket next year: United States v. Gall.9
In United States v. Booker, as I have described elsewhere,'0 the Su-
preme Court not only constitutionalized sentencing in a way it had not
done before, it altered the sentencing division of labor among the various
players in the criminal justice system. Ironically, a decision about the
jury's role restored the judge's role in sentencing. So long as the Guide-
lines required judges to find facts that had consequences pre-ordained by
the United States Sentencing Commission ("Commission"), what judges
did looked exactly like what juries were supposed to do, with few consti-
tutional protections. The result, the Court held, violated the Sixth
Amendment." As a remedy, the Court severed the provisions of the
SRA that made the Guidelines mandatory. 12 Courts were to "consider"
the Guidelines but could sentence individuals in light of all the purposes
of sentencing: retribution, deterrence, public safety, and rehabilitation.'
3
Appellate courts were to review sentencing decisions for "reasonable-
ness" and not, as they had done before, for their strict fealty to the Guide-
8. Oregon Judge Michael Marcus calls for redesigning the criminal justice system and sen-
tencing decisionmaking around the goal of "rational crime reduction" or "reducing reoffending." See
Michael H. Marcus, Sentencing in the Temple of Denunciation: Criminal Justice's Weakest Link, 1
OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 671, 677-81 (2004). He has created a sentencing information system which
focuses not on inputs but on information about available sanctions and recidivism. Michael Marcus:
Smart Sentencing, http://www.smartsentencing.com (last visited Sept. 15, 2007). To be sure, there is
a substantial debate about how much judges can affect crime rates even through "carefully crafted
sentences." Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Looking at the Model Penal Code Sentenc-
ing Provisions Through Canadian Lenses, 7 BUFF. CRiM. L. REv. 139, 154 n.33 (2003). Still others
have suggested that well-nm and well-targeted programs, particularly with drug offenders, can
reduce reoffending rates. Tonry, supra note 5, at 6.
9. 446 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 2933 (2007).
10. Nancy Gertner, Thoughts on Reasonableness, 19 FED. SENT'G. REP. 165, 165 (2007);
Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and Sentencing, 4 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 523, 536 (2007); Nancy Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing,
115 YALE L.J. 137 (Supp. 2006), available at http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/07/gertner.html.
11. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
12. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b)(1) (2007).
13. Id. § 3553(a)(2).
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lines. The Guidelines, in short, were "advisory,"' 4 the Court announced.
Judicial judgment in sentencing had returned, and not a minute too soon.
Sentencing individual human beings is different from other judicial
functions. It is singularly ill-suited to mandatory rules, which are bound
to treat as similar offenders and offenses that are in fact meaningfully
different.15 While the United States suffered under the mandatory federal
regime for the past two decades, virtually every industrial country con-
tinued to give considerable sentencing discretion to trial judges. 16 No
matter how different the rest of the judicial system was from ours-
adversary versus inquisitorial or common law versus civil code-and no
matter how much legislative supremacy was touted or how complex the
criminal code, modern sentencing was not governed by strict rules or
complex grids. Significant judicial discretion remained.
17
The difficulties of promulgating mandatory sentencing rules should
have been especially clear in the United States. Regional variations in
the application of the Guidelines persisted even during the mandatory
guideline regime. 18 As federal criminal prosecutions began to overlap
more and more with state prosecutions-the federalizing of street
crime' 9 -the pattern became even clearer. A national sentencing regime
may have been possible when criminal law was in fact national and dealt
with similar significant federal offenses like bank robbery or mail fraud.
As the federal law encompassed street crime to which local and federal
prosecutors had different priorities and judicial dockets different exigen-
cies, it was no surprise that regional differences persisted.20  Finally, a
national sentencing regime was made all the more difficult because of
continuing problems with the chaotic and disorganized federal criminal
code. The code lumped together a wide range of offenders under a single
label; the Guidelines did the same, but tried to break them down into
smaller subcategories which could be "objectively" evaluated-what was
14. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
15. See Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Equality Pathology, 54 EMORY L.J. 271, 276 (2005)
(discussing critically undue and excessive concerns about sentencing uniformity in modem sentenc-
ing reforms).
16. See Nancy Gertner, When Everyone Behaves Badly, 57 ME. L. REV. 569, 570 (2005).
17. See, e.g., Cornelius Nestler, Model Penal Code: Sentencing: Sentencing in Germany, 7
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 109, 109-11 (2003).
18. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINE SENTENCING (AN
ASSESSMENT OF How WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF
SENTENCING REFORM) 94 (2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/l 5_year/l 5_year studyfull.pdf
("The available evidence suggests that regional disparity remains under the guidelines, and some
evidence suggests it may have even increased among drug trafficking offenses.").
19. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, The Federalization of Crimi-
nal Law, 1998 A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. SEC. 1, 15-16, 16 n.28, available at
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/legislation/overcriminalization/$FILE/fedcrimiaw2.pdf.
20. See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Creating a "Hydra in Government": Federal Recourse to
State Law in Crime Fighting, 86 B.U. L. REV. 65, 78-79 (2006) (arguing that disparities derive from
differences in state treatment of criminal convictions, on which guideline treatment is based). See
generally Robert Heller, Selective Prosecution and the Federalization of Criminal Law: The Need
for Meaningful Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1309 (1997).
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the loss or the amount of drugs, minor or major role, nature of the vic-
tim. 21 In fact, as many district courts recognized, the differences that the
Guidelines did not take into account-like drug addiction, co-defendant
disparity, or mens rea-were often more significant than those it did.22
Just how far will the Supreme Court's leadership take us in this new
world of sentencing discretion? Other major criminal justice decisions of
the Supreme Court, such as United States v. Lopez, 23 have gone nowhere
and are effectively ignored by the lower courts.24 Other bold new strokes
resulted in retreat as their implications became clear, as was the case
with the Supreme Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence.25  Signifi-
cantly, other sentencing decisions in the post-guideline era that would
have introduced more judicial discretion into the process have also been
undermined by the courts charged with applying them. This is not the
first time the Supreme Court has told the district courts that there should
not be mandatory sentencing. In Koon v. United States,26 the Court un-
derscored the fact that judicial discretion remained even post-Guidelines,
and endorsed a review standard, abuse of discretion, that would be more
deferential to the trial court. Its message, however, was widely ignored27
even before legislation was passed that wholly eviscerated it.28  And
when Justice Breyer-an architect of the Guidelines as a member of the
first Sentencing Commission-emphasized that judicial discretion in
sentencing remained even under a Guideline regime in his decisions as
an appellate judge,29 the Court hardly listened. The First Circuit-the
21. See United States v. Ennis, 468 F. Supp. 2d 228, 230 (D. Mass. 2006); Gertner, From
Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 10, at 535.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Maisonet, 493 F. Supp. 2d 255, 263-65 (D. P.R. 2007) (depart-
ing in part based on the extent to which defendant's lifestyle was inconsistent with the quantity of
drugs the government would argue should be attributed to him); Ennis, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 229-31
(departing in part based on the extent to which defendant's lifestyle was inconsistent with the quan-
tity of drugs the government would argue should be attributed to him); United States v. Jaber, 362 F.
Supp. 2d 365, 379, 382 (D. Mass. 2005) (departing downward for the franchisee of a drug trafficking
operation so that it was no longer than the sentence for the franchisor who was far more culpable);
United States v. Woodley, 344 F. Supp. 2d 274, 275 (D. Mass. 2004) (taking drug addiction into
account in evaluating defendant's record); United States v. Costello, 16 F. Supp. 2d 36, 39-40 (D.
Mass. 1998) (departing downward for laborers who earned little for transporting valuable computer
equipment as compared to the ringleader).
23. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
24. See Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New Com-
merce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1253, 1253-54 (2003).
25. See, e.g., Nancy Gertner, Circumventing Juries, Undermining Justice: Lessons from
Criminal Trials and Sentencing, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 419,436 (1999).
26. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
27. See KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS 99-103 (1998).
28. Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of
2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(b), (g), (i), 117 Stat. 650, 668-69, 671-73 (codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(e) (2007)) (popularly known as the Feeney Amendment).
29. United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 52 (1st Cir, 1989) ("[W]e read the Guide-




court on which he was about to lead as the Chief Judge-became one of
the most mandatory of the mandatory guideline circuits.
Elsewhere, I have tried to understand why federal sentencing has
proved to be so resistant to change.30  Federal judges, who opposed
guidelines twenty years ago when they were first proposed and who pro-
tested any incursion on sentencing authority, enforced the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines with a rigor not required by the text or the legisla-
tion. 3' The reasons behind this transformation are critical to evaluating
the likely impact of Booker and now Rita. In short, it takes more than an
announcement-"Now hear this! The Guidelines are advisory! "-to
make them so.
3 2
There are several reasons: First, the Sentencing Guidelines brought
with them something like the ideology that surrounds continental civil
codes: The Guidelines were comprehensive; the work of "experts"; if
there were gaps, the "experts" from the Sentencing Commission would
fill them in. The judges became clerks looking through the voluminous
Guidelines for sentencing answers. 33 Second, the pernicious anti-judge
climate of the past two decades provided every incentive for judges to
follow the Guidelines---"I had no choice but to sentence you to 150
months under the Guidelines" was a familiar refrain. Third, the judiciary
had changed in fundamental ways over the past twenty years, leaving
many judges without any criminal justice experience apart from guide-
line sentencing. 34 Fourth, the psychological phenomenon of "anchoring"
when standards are linked to numerical ranges had a substantial impact.35
Fifth, there was no competing philosophy of sentencing among trial
judges; the sentencing Guidelines effectively preempted the field.36 And
this was particularly so in the appellate courts, which had never ad-
dressed sentencing at all before the Guidelines.
Given this history, how the Supreme Court defines "reasonable-
ness" review and the weight it gives to the Guidelines is critical. The
question is not, as some have suggested, "How can judicial authority be
reined in again so that there will not be a return to the days of indetermi-
nate sentencing? ' 37 Rather, the question is, "What does it take to restore
judicial sentencing authority after nearly twenty years of passivity, after
30. See Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 10, at 524 (arguing that sen-
tencing, which had been an area of an American judge's "unique competence," became its "polar
opposite in twenty short years").
31. Id.
32. See Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, supra note 10, at
137.
33. See Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 10, at 534.
34. Id at 533 n.40.
35. Id. at 535.
36. Id. at 533.
37. See Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, supra note 10, at
137-38.
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the judicial culture has fundamentally changed, not to mention the politi-
cal atmosphere, and after judicial sentencing expertise, to the extent it
existed at all, has become vestigial?
' 38
Rita involved a within-guideline sentence that the Fourth Circuit, in
a per curiam decision, had affirmed as presumptively reasonable. 39 The
decision was problematic for two reasons: First, as I have described,
given the past two decades of slavish guideline compliance, the "pre-
sumptively reasonable" label will only hasten the slide to "mandatori-
ness" and hence, constitutional error. Second, the Sentencing Guidelines
do not deserve the label. This agency has hardly functioned like the ex-
pert agency envisioned by the SRA, much less like the kind of adminis-
trative agency to which deference is due. It has been, as Justice Scalia
described it, a "junior-varsity Congress.
'40
In addition, for the Guidelines to be truly advisory requires that
there be an alternative to guideline-speak. That means that courts neces-
sarily have to be willing and encouraged to engage in two kinds of think-
ing: First, courts have to be willing to critically examine the Guidelines.
Many Guidelines were not keyed to the statute's purposes; various num-
bers on which sentences were "anchored" were not empirically tested,
but often just picked out the air, the product of political compromise.41
Second, courts have to be willing to develop other approaches, including
those rejected by the Guidelines' drafters. Why not consider drug addic-
tion when there is a body of literature about which treatments are effica-
cious? Why not look afresh at the imprisonment of first offenders given
the literature on their recidivism?
How then does Rita measure up? It was a mixed decision. It said, in
effect, that if appellate courts wish to label the Guidelines "presump-
tively reasonable" they may (within certain limits), but they are not re-
quired to do so.42 The Court did not cast its lot with the "Guidelines are
presumptively reasonable" group, as the government urged and many
appellate courts found. Nor did it conclude that the Guidelines were
38. Gertner, Thoughts on Reasonableness, supra note 10, at 165 (suggesting that the Court
look to areas that involve similar institutional questions about the allocation of decisional authority,
such as appeals under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as well as federal habeas review
under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), and further suggesting that the
question for courts of appeals under the APA and federal habeas is not whether the initial decision
maker was wrong in its interpretation or application of law, that is, whether the reviewing court
would have made a different decision. Rather, the question is whether the initial decision maker was
"unreasonably wrong.").
39. United States v. Rita, 177 F. App'x 357, 358 (4th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
40. United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41. See United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365, 371-77; see also STIT14 & CABRANES,
supra note 27, at 95 (describing Guidelines as a set of "administrative diktats" that the Commission
"promulgated and enforced ipse dixit"). "Even for those categories of cases in which the Commis-
sion did indeed seek to replicate past sentencing averages, the Commission's data was limited, and
possibly compromised, in several fundamental respects." Id. at 61.
42. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462-63 (2007).
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merely one factor among many, as the federal defenders and Justice
Souter, in dissent, had suggested.43 There is, in short, something for eve-
ryone here. On the one hand, Rita (with Justice Breyer writing for the
majority) dilutes the impact of the "presumption of reasonableness" even
as it affirms its use. This presumption is not a binding presumption like
trial-related evidentiary presumptions which oblige one side or the other
to shoulder a particular burden of proof."a Nor does it reflect the kind of
deference that a court is obliged to give to an expert agency rather than a
district judge. And it is an appellate presumption, not a district court
standard.45
Nevertheless, Justice Breyer's reasoning surely gives the Guidelines
46the kind of "gravitational pull" of which Justice Souter warns. As the
Court notes, the presumption reflects the fact that, by the time an appeals
court is considering a within-guideline sentence on review, "both the
sentencing judge and the Sentencing Commission will have reached the
same conclusion as to the proper sentence in the particular case., 47 That
"double determination," the Court held, "significantly increases the like-
lihood that the sentence is a reasonable one. 48 In other words, "sentenc-
ing statutes envision both the sentencing judge and the Commission as
carrying out the same basic § 3553(a) objectives, the one, at retail, the
other at wholesale. 4 9 The problem is that Justice Breyer's comments
overstate both the reasonableness of the Guidelines and the nature of the
trial sentencing process that has been so completely skewed by them. It
envisions two fully developed processes that happily coincide on the
reasonable sentence. The reality is quite different.
With respect to the Guidelines: Justice Breyer's analysis of the
Guidelines' rationale reiterates the ideology of the Guideline formation-
not their actual genesis or operation. In fact, it mirrors the very ideologi-
cal framework, which I have described, that Justice Breyer played a sub-
stantial role in creating and has for years attempted to implement. 50 In
43.
[1]f sentencing judges attributed substantial gravitational pull to the now-discretionary
Guidelines, if they treated the Guidelines result as persuasive or presumptively appropri-
ate, the Booker remedy would in practical terms preserve the very feature of the Guide-
lines that threatened to trivialize the jury right. For a presumption of Guidelines reason-
ableness would tend to produce Guidelines sentences almost as regularly as mandatory
Guidelines had done, with judges finding the facts needed for a sentence in an upper
subrange. This would open the door to undermining Apprendi itself, and this is what has
happened today.
Id. at 2487 (Souter, J., dissenting).
44. See id. at 2463 (majority opinion).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2487 (Souter, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 2463 (majority opinion).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. The Guidelines introduction, quoted liberally in Rita, mirrors Justice Breyer's comments
in Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They
Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 5 (1988).
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fact, this account of the bona fides of the Sentencing Commission and its
product gave rise to the presumption of reasonableness in the post-
Booker era in the first place.51 And once again, in Rita, Justice Breyer
described his hopes that Guidelines post-Booker can coexist alongside a
more robust judicial discretion, notwithstanding the unsuccessful at-
tempts to do just that in Koon (when Justice Breyer was on the Supreme
Court) and Diaz- Villafane (when Justice Breyer was on the First Circuit).
While his language is tempered-he acknowledges that the guideline
drafters eschewed identifying which of the sentencing purposes they
were enacting, 52 and he concedes that the Guidelines are "a rough ap-
proximation of sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)'s objectives ' -53 -
the effect may well be the same. The Court in effect says that where the
sentence is within the Guidelines, the trial court does not have to say
much to justify it. To busy courts, that alone has a gravitational pull.
As far as the trial judges' sentencing processes are concerned, the
Court ignores the extent to which the Guidelines have profoundly altered
sentencing advocacy. Parties-even post-Booker--continue to argue in
terms of guideline facts, 54 rarely even developing a guideline critique
much less an alternative rationale for sentencing. Discovery regarding
sentencing factors is not covered by the federal rules. 55 Defendants con-
tinue to fear that if they press for additional discovery, or indeed litigate
51. See United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 912-21 (D. Utah 2005). Wilson was
issued within days after United States v. Booker, it announces in language very similar to Justice
Breyer's in Rita that a guideline sentence must be given "considerable weight." Id. at 912. The
"presumptively reasonable" courts base their analysis on very similar logic. See, e.g., United States
v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 456-57 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2309 (2006); United States
v. Newsom, 428 F.3d 685, 686-87 (7th Cir. 2005).
52. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2463; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IAL.L. n.3
(2006) (noting that the U.S. Sentencing Commission could not "reconcile the differing perceptions
of the purposes of criminal punishment"); Dissenting View of Commissioner Paul H. Robinson on
the Promulgation of Sentencing Guidelines by the United States Sentencing Commission, 52 Fed.
Reg. 18046, 18121 (May 13, 1987) ("Of all of the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act, it is most
unfortunate that the goal of rationality has been abandoned and even frustrated by these guide-
lines."); Paul J. Hofer, Immediate and Long-Term Effects of United States v. Booker: More Discre-
tion, More Disparity, or Better Reasoned Sentences?, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 425, 465 (2006) (noting the
"Commission's failure to articulate a philosophy for federal sentencing").
53. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Maisonet, No. 06-150(JAG), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46768, at
*6-7 (D. P.R. June 26, 2007) (noting that Counsel only developed a record of guideline-specific
facts).
55. Sentencing Guidelines Policy Statement § 6A1.2 opines that "[clourts should adopt pro-
cedures to provide for the timely disclosure of the presentence report." Sentencing Guidelines for
United States Courts, 53 Fed. Reg. 15530, 15535 (June 15, 1988). And § 6A1.3 of the Guidelines
Manual goes on to declare that "parties shall be given an adequate opportunity to present informa-
tion to the court." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 52, § 6A1.3(a). But the
Guidelines nowhere require disclosure of the evidence on which the probation officer relies in pre-
paring the presentence report, or advance disclosure to the defense of the "information" the govern-
ment intends to "present ... to the court." Id. While FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 requires the disclosure of
facts necessary to proof of guilt, that may not be the same as facts at issue in sentencing. In any
case, Rule 16 obligations arguably end at the plea. The obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence
continues past the plea and covers issues which would diminish a defendant's punishment, but what
that consists of is frequently a matter of dispute.
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56anything, they will risk a higher guideline sentence. Some prosecutors
have added discovery waivers to plea agreements. 7 Probation officers
are not trained or encouraged to engage in anything other than "guide-
line-speak." Without information or advocacy with respect to alterna-
tives outside of the Guidelines, "presumptive" will, once again, slide to
"mandatory," or something short of that: namely, "Guidelines-Lite."
Take the case of Victor Rita:58 Mr. Rita was charged with making
two false statements to a federal grand jury.59 The grand jury was inves-
tigating InterOrdnance, a company prosecutors believed distributed a kit
capable of assembling a machine gun without proper registration.60 After
Rita had bought one of the kits, he was contacted by the Bureau of Alco-
hol, Tobacco, and Firearms and Explosives (ATF).6' Before meeting
with the agent, however, Rita returned the kit and turned over to the ATF
another which did not amount to a machine gun.62 He then denied before
the grand jury that the government had asked him for the machine gun
kit, and denied that he contacted someone at the company after he was
contacted by the ATF.63 The government charged Rita with perjury,
making false statements, and obstructing justice. He was convicted on
all counts before a jury.64
The guideline offense level was driven by the offense level of the
underlying crime with respect to which the perjury was committed, here
InterOrdnance's possible violation of the machine gun registration law.65
The level for perjury in connection with that offense required taking as
the offense level "6 levels lower than the offense level for the underlying
offense." 66 The underlying offense level was 26;67 thus the base offense
56. Margareth Etienne, The Declining Utility of the Right to Counsel in Federal Criminal
Courts: An Empirical Study on the Diminished Role of Defense Attorney Advocacy under the Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 92 CAL. L. REV. 425, 443-64 (2004) (arguing that the Sentencing Guidelines
system deters effective advocacy and penalizes zealous representation by equating it with the defen-
dant's obstruction ofjustice or failure to accept responsibility).
57. Erica G. Franklin, Waiving Prosecutorial Disclosure in the Guilty Plea Process: A De-
bate on the Merits of "Discovery" Waivers, 51 STAN. L. REV. 567, 567 (1999).
58. It should be noted that the Defendant moved for a rehearing after the President commuted
the sentence of Lewis Libby, arguing that the government was taking inconsistent positions. Petition
for Rehearing, Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007) (No. 06-5754), 2007 WL 2155533.
59. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2459 (2007).
60. Id.




65. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 52, § 2M5.2 (sentencing for violation
of 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778(b)(2) (2007) (importing defense articles without authorization)).
66. Id. § 2X3.1.
67. Id. § 2M5.2.
2007]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
level was 20.68 Rita had a criminal history of I, leading to a guideline
range of 33 to 41 months.69
The defense presented evidence that Rita had an extensive record of
government service, was a dedicated family man, and had a number of
physical ailments attributable to his military service.70 For 24 years, Rita
had served in the United States Marine Corps, the United States Army,
and the United States Army Reserve.71 His service included tours of
duty in Vietnam and the Gulf Wars, and he had received more than 35
awards and medals for distinguished conduct.72 As a result of his service
he had several ailments, including skin rashes following exposure to
Agent Orange during the Vietnam War as well as post traumatic stress
disorder.73 He also had diabetes, which caused him periodic numbness in
the feet as well as memory and eyesight loss. 74 He suffered from arthri-
tis, an enlarged prostate, acid reflux, a herniated disk, and sleep apnea.75
To treat these conditions, Mr. Rita-who was 59 years old-required a
long list of prescription medications. 76 His service had left him so dis-
abled that he was totally and permanently unemployable.77
At sentencing, the district court heard Rita's presentation but con-
cluded that it was "unable to find that the [presentence] [report's recom-
mended] sentencing guideline range . . . is an inappropriate guideline
range for that, and under 3553 ... the public needs to be protected if it is
true, and I must accept as true the jury verdict., 78 In light of Rita's per-
sonal history and physical condition, what would it have taken to con-
vince the judge otherwise? Clearly, the court's remarks suggest that Rita
had to show that he was somehow extraordinary, not the usual person in
this guideline range. That harks back to the pre-Rita days and a "heart-
land" analysis that rarely succeeded.79 Indeed, the Solicitor General said
as much during the argument. 80 To credit a non-guideline approach here,
he argued, would be subjective, and would risk the return of sentencing
disparities: "[W]e are in a Federal system with 674 Federal district
judges, and we cannot have all our own personal guidelines systems. 81
68. Of course, nothing in the Guidelines indicates why the Commission chose six levels,
rather than four or three.
69. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2461.
70. Petition for Rehearing, supra note 58, at *4, *5.






77. Id. at *6.
78. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007) (second alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
79. Id. at 2461; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 52, § 5K2.0.
80. Transcript of Oral Argument at *37, Rita, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (No. 06-5754), 2007 WL




He used as an example of an unreasonable sentence one in which the
judge "takes a guidelines range like this one, of 33 months to 41 months,
and the judge says in my view military service means that this defendant
gets probation. ' 2
Of course, no judge should say, "Military service in my personal
guideline system means this defendant should get probation" (although,
to be sure, that comment may be no more rational than the Commission,
which held without explanation that such service should never be in-
cluded). A judge might say, instead, that the Guideline that excludes
military service from consideration may be appropriate in general,83 but
that in this case-in light of Rita's minimal criminal history, age and
illness-it is not. A judge might say that the guideline result in this case
is inconsistent with statutory edict. Section 9940) of the SRA ordered
the Commission to "insure that the guidelines reflect the general appro-
priateness of imposing a sentence other than imprisonment in cases in
which the defendant is a first offender who has not been convicted of a
crime of violence or an otherwise serious offense ... The Commis-
sion, however, implemented that directive by redefining "serious of-
fense" in a way that was entirely at odds with prior practice, without em-
pirical support, and, in fact, inconsistent with its own deterrence stud-
ies.85 A reasoned critique of the Guidelines is hardly the "personal
guidelines system" the Solicitor General mocked.86 Indeed, it might well
become a new national standard in like cases.
In short, the fact that a district court's sentence is aligned with that
of the Commission does not necessarily indicate that there was careful
reflection about what the appropriate sentence should have been, but may
simply reflect a judge's good faith effort to comply with the Guidelines
(knowing their traction even post-Booker), or the failure of effective ad-
vocacy at sentencing. In Rita, the district court did not have to say very
much to justify the Guideline sentence-no opinion, no detailed findings.
And for the Fourth Circuit, all it took to affirm it was a per curiam opin-
ion. The "gravitational pull" of the Guidelines, particularly in a circuit
that is amenable to the "guidelines as presumptive" approach, limits sen-
tencing arguments, stops meaningful critique of the Guidelines, and en-
courages cursory treatment of the sentence on all levels, at trial and on
appeal.
82. Id. at *38.
83. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 52, § 5H 1. 11 (prohibiting considera-
tion of military service without explanation or legislative history). Section 5H1.11 was enacted-
without explanation-to overrule United States v. Pipich, 688 F. Supp. 191 (D. Md. 1988). See
Sharon M. Bunzel, The Probation Officer and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Strange Bedfel-
lows, 104 YALE L.J. 933,955-56, 956 n.134 (1994).
84. 28 U.S.C.A. § 9940) (2007).
85. United States v. Germosen, 473 F. Supp. 2d 221, 228 (D. Mass. 2007).
86. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 80, at *37.
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Where will the Supreme Court go from here? Gall v. United
States8 7 will give the Court an opportunity to stop the gravitational pull
of the Guidelines, or, at the very least, create an equal and opposite force,
a paradigm of what a non-guideline approach might look like. In Gall,
the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute
MDMA, commonly known as "ecstasy." 88 He had participated in a con-
spiracy that involved ecstasy distribution from February 2000 until Sep-
tember 2000. The conspiracy predated his entrance, beginning May
1996, and continued long after he left, until October 2002. Although he
was making a considerable amount of money, which, as a working class
young man he sorely needed, in September 2000 he informed his co-
conspirators that he was "getting out of the drug business and wanted
nothing more to do with [it]." His withdrawal was voluntary, as there
was no hint of a government investigation at the time. 89 And he stayed
out of the drug business, fully believing his criminal days were behind
him, until an indictment was filed in April 2004. By that time the defen-
dant had started a business; earned a Bachelor of Science degree in com-
puter science; was supported by coworkers and family; and had begun to
come to grips with his alcohol and drug addiction. Numerous witnesses
testified on his behalf about the changes that he had effected between
2000 and 2002. The record disclosed his company was on the verge of
beginning a major construction project when he was indicted. He had
the lowest criminal history score, Criminal History I, with a few minor
offenses. He offered to cooperate with the government, but since his
information was stale-he had left the conspiracy long before-he had
nothing to offer prosecutors.
The Guidelines calculation was classic. It was driven by the quan-
tity of MDMA tablets involved during the conspiracy, resulting in an
offense level of 24.90 The defendant received some reductions for his
acceptance of responsibility, and willingness to give an accurate proffer,
but they paled in comparison to the offense level. He received a two
point reduction under § 5C 1.2 of the Guidelines for being "'safety valve'
eligible," and a three point reduction for "acceptance of responsibility." 91
The adjusted offense level was 19, yielding a guideline range of 30 to 37
months.
92
The defendant made several departure motions based on his age,
cooperation with the government, remorse, aberrant conduct, and post-
87. 127 S. Ct. 2933 (2007) (granting certiorari).
88. Unless otherwise noted, the following factual background is from United States v. Gall,
446 F.3d 884, 885-88 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 2933 (2007) [hereinafter United
States v. Gall].
89. Unless otherwise noted, the following information pertaining to Gall's personal history is
taken from United States v. Gall, 374 F. Supp. 2d 758, 761 (S.D. Iowa 2005) [hereinafter Gall].





offense rehabilitation.9 3 However, given the Eighth Circuit's departure
law, all pre-Booker, the Court felt there was no basis for a departure.94
The trial court, taking into account the factors under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), decided, in effect, that any term of imprisonment was counter-
productive and wholly unjustified.95 In effect, as described above, the
judge "added up the column of figures" 96 and concluded that the total
made no sense by any measure. The offense level, based solely on drug
quantity, substantially overstated Gall's actual culpability. Indeed, many
of the salient factors here-both as to recidivism and culpability-were
simply not counted: his age, his withdrawal from the conspiracy, the life
he had built. There was, in short, a significant difference between Gall
and most offenders in this category, a difference which was understand-
able and reasoned. The trial court sentenced Gall to probation for three
years.97
The Eighth Circuit, a "presumptively reasonable" circuit, reversed.98
First, the court's approach made outside-the-Guidelines sentences ex-
tremely unlikely, every bit as unlikely as in the pre-Booker days. The
court noted that how compelling the justification for the variance had to
be depended upon the extent of the difference between the guideline
range and the sentence imposed. 99 Since the guideline range was 30
months, a probation sentence amounted to a 100 percent variance-an
extraordinary one that had to be supported by extraordinary reasons.
The district court's reasons-articulated both on the record and in a
lengthy decision, and far, far more elaborate than the district court's rea-
sons in Rita-did not suffice. First, according to the Eighth Circuit, the
district court placed too much emphasis on Gall's withdrawal from the
conspiracy when the Guidelines had already accounted for that by apply-
ing the Guidelines from an earlier, and more lenient book, and by the fact
that Gall was not being held accountable for the drugs of other co-
conspirators.100 Second, the district court gave inappropriate considera-
tion to Gall's age, which the Guidelines do not permit.' 0 ' Third, the
93. Id. at 760-61.
94. United States v. Gall, 446 F.3d at 889. There is at least an argument that one way to
address potential disparity post-Booker is to reevaluate this departure law, now in the light of 18
U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (2007). Departure law evolved when the Guidelines were mechanically applied;
few appellate court decisions keyed their holdings to anything other than the specific language of the
Guidelines-under which family circumstances were evaluated for "extraordinariness" rather than in
light of their effects on recidivism or deterrence. See United States v. Germosen, 473 F. Supp. 2d
221, 222-23 (D. Mass. 2007); United States v. Ennis, 468 F. Supp. 2d 228, 229 (D. Mass. 2006).
95. Gall, 374 F. Supp. 2d at 763.
96. Id. at 760.
97. Id. at 763.
98. United States v. Gall, 446 F.3d at 889 (quoting United States v. Myers, 439 F.3d 415,417
(8th Cir. 2006)).
99. Id,
100. Id. at 889-90.
101. id. at 890.
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court did not properly weigh the seriousness of ecstasy distribution, as
the Guidelines provide. 0 2 Fourth, the court did not consider whether his
sentence would create "unwarranted sentencing disparities,"10 3 which the
Guidelines were intended to eliminate. And fifth, the court placed too
much emphasis on post-offense rehabilitation, another ground demeaned
by the Guidelines. 0 4 In effect, the court was saying, as courts have done
for two decades, that the Guidelines cover pretty much everything and
everyone.
This was not a review as under the AEDPA or the APA. There was
no consideration of a range of reasonable sentences, including the sen-
tence imposed by the thoughtful trial court judge who had heard wit-
nesses, lived with the case, sentenced the codefendants and had written
an opinion. This was a decision that said: "The Guidelines are the gold
standard; deviate from them at your peril."
To be sure, the government might say here, as it did in Rita, that the
trial court's decision was nothing more than the "personal" weighing of
one judge-like the judge who would have "personally" valued military
service in his guideline universe. And it will say yet again: If judges are
permitted to do this, disparity would reign again as it had pre-Guidelines.
That position wholly ignores the impact of two decades of guideline
analysis on judges and advocates, and of the continued traction of the
Guidelines, whether or not they are labeled as mandatory. And it ignores
the way the common law evolves, the way judges persuade other judges,
the way judicial precedents are created. If the trial court's reasoning is
applied by other judges in like cases, it will not be because they wish to
implement their own normative imperatives, but because they have been
persuaded by the court's reasoning. New standards will evolve along-
side the guideline standards. Surely, judges can be trusted to make
meaningful distinctions-which the Guidelines as a national system
could not make-between co-conspirators who find religion with the
constable at the door, and those who do not; between individuals who do
everything that prison is supposed to get them to do-put their lives in
order, secure a job, an education, address their addictions. Surely, the
public would understand the difference between Gall and his co-
defendants. And surely judges can be trusted-indeed, encouraged-to
think critically, like lawyers are supposed to do, about these Guidelines
and the rules they have created, about when they should apply and when
they should not.'05
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2006)).
104. Id.
105. In United States v. Germnosen, 473 F. Supp. 2d 221 (D. Mass. 2007), I applied the aberrant
conduct guideline to a defendant, a drug "mule," recognizing that the language did not strictly apply,
but noting the deficiencies of the guideline analysis in cases like the one before me. I mentioned the
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Gall offers the Supreme Court an opportunity to say what it did not
say in Rita. Sentencing is an imperfect exercise. The Guidelines were
flawed; as the Guidelines' Introduction conceded, 10 6 they could not pos-
sibly account for the full range of sentencing situations. If the reasons
offered in Gall do not pass muster while those in Rita do, Booker will
have gone the way of Koon and the sentencing reforms it triggered will
be at an end.
government's concerns whenever factors like employment or family are added to the equation, and
the risk that in considering those factors, white collar offenders will be treated too leniently. I held:
True, some of the letters to the Commission by groups interested in the [aberrant conduct
Guideline] were concerned about the abuse of aberrant behavior departures in the case of
white-collar offenders. But those concerns do not apply here. This case is not about the
well-heeled banker who commits a substantial fraud, all the while supporting the local
symphony and countless community groups. It is not about white-collar offenders who
try to buy their way out of trouble by pointing to their charitable contributions. This case
involves a man who struggled all his life, supported his community at great personal risk,
and then made a mistake. It is not about Enron. It is about a drug mule.
Id. at 223-24 (emphasis added).
106. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 52, § 1Al.l (Historical Note 4(b))
(explaining its policy, the Commission noted that "it is difficult to prescribe a single set of guidelines
that encompasses the vast range of human conduct potentially relevant to a sentencing decision.").
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